Of bodies and burkinis: institutional Islamophobia, Islamic dress and the colonial condition by Brayson, Kimberley
Of bodies and burkinis: institutional Islamophobia, Islamic 
dress and the colonial condition
Article  (Accepted Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Brayson, Kimberley (2019) Of bodies and burkinis: institutional Islamophobia, Islamic dress and 
the colonial condition. Journal of Law and Society, 46 (1). pp. 55-82. ISSN 0263-323X 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/id/eprint/80509/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
1 
 
Of Bodies and Burkinis: Institutional Islamophobia, Islamic Dress and the Colonial Condition 
Kimberley Brayson* 
The 2016 burkini controversy and the criminalisation of visibly Muslim women in France is 
a violent reminder of the precarity of colonial bodies in public space. These laws 
demonstrate the ongoing management of colonial bodies and communities which speaks 
over time from historical colonisation to present, and future, neocolonial narratives. This 
article moves beyond the dominant logics of security and gender oppression in the Islamic 
dress debate which, it is argued, are invoked in a strategic manner to obfuscate the colonial 
condition and engender a normative, institutional Islamophobia in the public-political 
imaginary. The article critiques the instrumental use of law in creating political space for 
such agendas and analyses the whiteness of public space and institutions. The article insists 
that it is necessary to acknowledge the epistemic lens of the colonial condition in the Islamic 
dress debate and critically reflects on the alienation and reduced capacity for action of 
bodies wearing Islamic dress. 
INTRODUCTION 
On 24 August 2016 the Islamic dress debate erupted again, on a beach in Nice. A Muslim woman 
lying on the beach was approached by four armed police men and asked to remove items of 
clothing that were considered to contravene a rule enacted in the wake of the Bastille Day attack 
in Nice,1 which had been claimed by Islamic State.2 She was also issued with an on the spot fine.  
The term ‘Muslim women’ is inherently problematic for the universalism that the term propagates,  
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1 Le Conseil d’Etat, CE decision du 26 septembre 2016, No 403578. 
2 H. Karimi, ‘No liberty, no equality, no fraternity: The death of French secularism’, Middle East Eye, 3 September 
2016 <http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/no-liberty-no-equality-and-no-fraternity-death-french-secularism-
1248910892>. 
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denying cultural variations and specificities.3 For the purposes of this article, the term should not 
be understood as essentialising Muslim women as a homogenous group. The term Muslim women 
is therefore employed in a strategic manner,4 and is understood in its situated and materialist 
context as disclosing many divergent realities.  
The controversies surrounding Islamic dress depend on the situated context in which they take 
place. Context notwithstanding, the persistence and unresolved nature of these controversies 
unifies varying discourses on Islamic dress. The term Islamic dress is understood as constituted 
through difference to include the hijab, a veil or headscarf, jilbab, full black dress head to toe, 
burqa, a cloak covering the whole body including the face, niqab, the face veil. The burkini can 
now be added to this list.5 The administrative rule in question on the beach in Nice refers to modes 
of dress that do not cover the face and follows the criminalisation of visibly Muslim women 
through the enactment of French law 2010-11926 which prohibits wearing full-face coverings in 
French public space. The oft-witnessed conflation of forms of Islamic dress7 points to the fact that 
these acts of censure are strategic and instrumental in pursuing wider political aims. In the context 
of French restrictions on Islamic dress, the strategic political aim is the assimilation of colonial 
bodies in pursuit of neolcolonial aspirations. 
                                                          
3  N. J. Hirschmann, ‘Western Feminism, Eastern Veiling, and the Question of Free Agency’ (1998) 5:3 
Constellations, 346. 
4 G. C. Spivak, The Post-colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, Dialogues, (1990) 11. 
5 The burkini can be likened to a wetsuit with a hood. The term burkini is derived from bikini. The term bikini was 
coined in 1946 by Louis Réard in Paris to describe the bathing suit. Réard named the bathing suit after the Bikini 
Atoll in the Marshall Islands to convey its explosive effect, Réard website <https://www.reard.com/en-uk/history>. 
The Oxford English Dictionary cites the etymology of bikini: Bikini, the name of an atoll in the Marshall Islands 
where an atomic bomb test was carried out in July, 1946 and attributes two meanings to the word bikini: 1. A large 
explosion. 2. [ < French, apparently < sense 1.] A scanty two-piece beach garment worn by women…[1947   Le 
Monde Illustré Août 929/1   Bikini, ce mot cinglant comme l'explosion même..correspondait au niveau du vêtement 
de plage à un anéantissement de la surface vêtue; à une minimisation extrême de la pudeur.] 
<http://www.oed.com.ezproxy.sussex.ac.uk/view/Entry/18925?redirectedFrom=bikini#eid>. The French text links 
the bikini garment with the Bikini explosion. The colonial origins of the term bikini are therefore acknowledged.  
The Bikini Atoll hosted the most destructive U.S. atomic bomb tests to date, displacing native populations and 
imperial actions persist today. The imperial inception of bikini as a garment signifies the appropriation by white 
women of the sexual allure attributed to native women in the enduring imperial imagination; ‘The "bikini" 
rehearses the central paradox of sexual modernity as some form of going native’, N. Hoad, ‘World Piece: What the 
Miss World Pageant Can Teach about Globalization’ (2004) 58 Cultural Critique, 56, at 62, 61-63. 
6 Access <https://www.legijfrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000022911670&categorieLien=id>. 
7 J. W. Scott, ‘Symptomatic Politics: The Banning of Islamic Head Scarves in French Public Schools’ (2005) 23:3 
French Politics, Culture and Society 106, at 115. 
3 
 
This article examines recent French laws, legal judgments, and political debates, in relation to 
Islamic dress.   A distinctive critique of the current legal approach is developed, which draws upon 
a broad range of postcolonial, feminist and phenomenological literatures as well as analysis of 
relevant European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments. The argument is that shifting legal 
justifications of gender oppression and national security simultaneously obfuscate and enact a 
strategy of cultural and colonial assimilation that controls and regulates Islamic bodies in public 
space. This article takes a different approach to existing literature on gender, race and law by 
introducing the colonial lens. In so doing it challenges the current state of ECtHR and French 
jurisprudence and analyses a rarely told aspect of contemporary French society. 
To begin, the article relocates the beach incident in Nice to its colonial context. This exposes the 
narrative that assimilates colonial subjects through social cohesion and civic integration policies8 
and maintains this issue as a matter of French domestic policy without sufficient external human 
rights law review. To support this argument the concepts of colonialism, Islamophobia, the French 
nation, and secularism are explored. 
The following sections offer important insights into how the logics of gender oppression and 
security act as modes of thinking about Islamic dress to divert attention away from the colonial 
substratum that is fundamental to, yet absent from, Islamic dress in French legal and public-
political discourse.  The logic of gender oppression and the logic of national security are explored 
and then the way that these logics interact and displace a failed logic of secularism is analysed. 
The article demonstrates that the colonial and racial dimensions are constitutive of the complexity 
of the Islamic dress debate but are purposely obscured from public consciousness. The critique is 
not of gender oppression and national security per se, but rather of the instrumental, strategic, use 
of these narratives as logics to eclipse the colonial and racial dimensions. 
The article analyses French case law on Islamic dress and critiques the introduction of the concept 
of ‘living together’ by the ECtHR in SAS v France9 as a justification for upholding the 
criminalization of forms of Islamic dress. Such endorsement speaks to the instrumental role of law 
                                                          
8 S. Mullally, 'Civic Integration, Gender Equality and the Veil: at the limit of Rights?' (2011) 74:1 Modern Law Rev., 
27. 
9 S.A.S v France (2015) 60 E.H.R.R. 11. 
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and human rights in lending legitimacy to domestic, neocolonial,10 political agendas resulting in 
structural discrimination against Muslim communities.  
The analysis turns to the phenomenological theory of Frantz Fanon11 and Sara Ahmed12 to explore 
how the legal-normative foundations of institutional Islamophobia as manifested in the censure of 
Islamic dress entrench a whiteness of public space and institutions that acts to disorient visibly 
Muslim bodies.  The conclusion is that law creates the political space for such agendas and that 
the regulation of the bodies of visibly Muslim women cannot be thought apart from colonialism 
as an epistemic form through which knowledge is produced.  
 
COLONIAL: PAST, PRESENT, FUTURE AND THE FRENCH NATION 
As decolonial scholars explain, colonial matters are not resigned to history but rather they structure 
the temporality of the past, present, and future. The colonial narrative is therefore the condition of 
modernity, which in its socio-epistemic form permeates knowledge production and modes of being 
in the world.13 This colonial condition is the context in which debates and restrictions on Islamic 
dress arise. Knowledge of Islamic dress is thus produced through the epistemic lens of the colonial 
condition and resurfaces under the contemporary label of Islamophobia. Islamophobia has been 
defined as ‘unfounded hostility towards Islam’14 including the way in which this hostility impacts 
on the lives of Muslim communities and individuals, resulting in social and political exclusion. 
Itaoui has mapped how Islamophobia constitutes a form of racism.15 For Edwards, Islamophobia 
is ‘latent Orientalism...condoned and justified by the threat of terrorism’.16 De Sousa Santos has 
identified an abyssal line between metropolitan and colonial societies that produces radical 
                                                          
10 B. De Sousa Santos, If God Were a Human Rights Activist (2015), 2, 4, 13. 
11 F. Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks (1986). 
12 S. Ahmed, Queer Phenomenology: Orientations, Objects, Others (2006). 
13 S. Posocco, ‘(De)Colonizing the Ear of the Other: Subjectivity, Ethics and Politics in Question’ in Decolonizing 
Sexualities: Transnational Perspectives Critical Interventions eds. S Bakshi, S. Jivraj, S. Posocco (2016) 250. 
14 The Runnymeade Trust Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia, Islamophobia a challenge for us all 
(1997) 4. 
15 R. Itaoui, ‘The Geography of Islamophobia in Sydney: mapping the spatial imaginaries of young Muslims’ (2016) 
47:3 Australian Geographer, 261, at 262. 
16 S. Edwards, ‘Defacing Muslim Women: Dialectical Meanings of Dress in the Body Politic’, in Rights in Context: 
Law and Justice in Late Modern Society ed R. Banakar (2010) 137. 
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exclusions.17 Far from being eliminated with the end of historical colonialism, these exclusions 
persist as part of the configuration of the present through neocolonial assimilation, racism, 
xenophobia and the permanent state of exception established regarding terrorists, undocumented 
migrant workers and asylum seekers.18 Restrictions on Islamic dress and Islamophobia sit 
alongside these categories as both the tool and effect of colonialism.  
 
The radical exclusions of colonialism structure the way in which law and society function and thus 
how knowledge is produced. These exclusions, concomitant restrictions and criminalisation are 
the cause of psychopathologies and alienation for colonial bodies targeted by such measures. As 
Posocco has explained ‘coloniality has to do with wounded body politics in the present; and the 
figurations of past, present, and future that emerge from them’.19 The Nice incident was 
particularly noteworthy as a potent reminder of the precarity of colonial bodies in public space. 
The action of this woman being required to remove clothing by armed police men demonstrated 
in a startling manner the diffuse power of the French state at its most violent in supressing and 
subsuming colonial narratives through eliminating colonial subjects from public space. The 
erasure of the colonial markers of this woman was performed on the beach in Nice for all to see 
and institutionalised by catachrestic legal definitions.20 The absence of colonial memory weighed 
heavily on the woman who was made an example of as either an agent of terror or a victim of 
gender oppression. The lack of colonial context belied a nuanced understanding of Islamic dress 
and instead the image resonated as a demonstration of state authority protecting the French 
citizenry from the threat to ordre public that this woman has come to (re)present. The 
dehistoricisation of this incident located the threat of terrorism in the body of this Muslim woman 
and appropriated her body as a symbol of terror, such that she became synonymous not with 
ongoing struggles of colonial subjects, but rather with a terrorist threat to the existence of the 
liberal, secular state. Her body was thereby used by the French state to control communities and 
public space in pursuit of strategic political agendas.  
                                                          
17 B. De Sousa Santos, ‘Beyond Abyssal Thinking: From Global Lines to Ecologies of Knowledge’ (2007) 30:1 Rev. 
Fernand Braudel Center, 45. 
18 De Sousa Santos, op. cit., n. 11, p. 2. 
19 Posocco, op. cit., n. 13, p. 250. 
20 J. Butler, Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative (1997) 72. 
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The language of the French republic was manifest in the administrative law, which required respect 
for accepted customs and secularism. The specific role of secularism in this debate has been 
considered elsewhere21 and is not therefore addressed here. It is however important to note the 
instrumental function of secularism as a means to facilitate and justify the political agenda of the 
French state. As Altglas has observed, ‘laïcité is what laïcité does’.22 Secularism is a self-
perpetuating term the meaning of which shifts with use to meet the strategic demands of a 
particular political situation. The legal instantiation of public space as secular23 has enabled the 
French state to retain tight legal control over public space, criminalising bodies that deviate from 
the republican, secular norm. 24 Legal support is thus given to the political appetite of the day. 
Political preferences also find support in a narrative secularism; a specifically French 
exceptionalism characterised by the restriction of religious visibility in the public sphere, which 
although not legally authoritative, entails a certain normative power.25 The French approach 
represents  the ‘enlightenment secularists’ of Europe who oppose  a multicultural approach in an 
ongoing Kulturkampf on the best way to organise European society.26 Secularism thus creates the 
political space for the French state to suppress colonial narratives and pursue an assimilationist 
agenda through law.  
 
As postcolonial activists in France have emphasised, whilst the category of colonial native or 
indigènes27 no longer exists as a legal category, ‘the regime of the indigénat still haunts 
institutions, practices and ideologies in France’.28 The colonising need to categorise in order to 
                                                          
21 See: T. Asad, ‘French Secularism and the “Islamic Veil Affair”’, (2006) SS The Hedgehog Review; K. Brayson, Law 
and Islamic Dress: a critique of human rights in Europe, (forthcoming). 
22 V. Altglas, ‘Laicité is what laicité does: Rethinking the French Cult Controversy’, (2010) 58:3 Current Sociology, 
489. 
23 1905 Law on the separation of Church and State; Article 1 French Constitution 1958. 
24 Asad, op. cit., n. 21, p. 95. 
25 V. Amiraux & D. Koussens, ‘From principle to narratives: Unveiling French secularism’, in, Religions in the public 
sphere: Accommodating religious diversity in the post-secular era eds G. D’ Amato & F. Colom RECODE working 
papers no. 19, 4. 
26 French laïcité is but one form of secularism. See: T. Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, 
Modernity (2003). On the Kulturkampf between multiculturalists and enlightenment secularists in which this article 
intervenes see: J Habermas, ‘Notes on Post-Secular Society’, (2008) 25:4 New Perspectives Q., 24. 
27 Indigènes is the French word used to describe ‘native’ subjects of the colonies, in particular those colonial 
subjects from the North African countries of Algeria, Morocco and sub-Saharan Africa. The related and opposite 
category of évolués is used to describe assimilated ‘natives’ in French colonial practice. 
28 T. Martin ‘Anti-racism, Republicanism and the Sarkozy Years: SOS Racisme and the Mouvement des Indigénes de 
la République’ in France’s Colonial Legacies: Memory, Identity, Narrative, ed F Barclay (2013) 198 citing Sadri 
Khiari, Pour une politique de la racaille (2006) 17.  
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manage immediately reduces the complexity of experience and relationality. 29 Law and the 
process of juridification30 also functions with this insistence to reduce complex subjectivities 
through categorisation leaving both the colonial condition and its main ally, the law, woefully 
inadequate to articulate the multiplicities that cohere around Islamic dress and the complex, 
situated subjectivities of those wearing it. The erasure of colonial markers from the colonial body, 
and in turn the colonial body itself, is characteristic of the ‘(dis-)identificatory dynamics’31 of 
colonialism. This erasure of the colonial body mirrors the absence of the colonial condition from 
contemporary debates on Islamophobia and Islamic dress and endorses the exclusions, restrictions 
and prohibitions of the colonial lens. The epistemic consequences of how knowledge is produced 
through this colonial condition are thus overlooked, enabling neocolonial assimilation agendas to 
be carried out almost unquestioned. 
 
Fanon described how the French colonial project in Algeria was signified through the systematic 
unveiling of Algerian women.32 Consequently, the veil came to represent Algerian national 
resistance to French colonisation.33 In response, the familiar language of liberating Algerian 
women by unveiling them was employed by the French state.34 Such language echoes 
contemporary justifications offered by the French state in the public-political process preceding 
the adoption of the 2004 French law banning conspicuous religious symbols in the classroom.35 
The Stasi Commission, which debated the law, refused on principle to hear evidence of ‘veiled 
girls’36 but did consider the evidence of secular Muslim women who supported the law.37  The 
Commission considered the veil to stand for the alienation of women38 and that laïcité, could not 
                                                          
29 Posocco, op. cit., n. 13, p. 250. 
30 J. Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume II, Lifeworld and System: A Critique of Functionalist 
Reason (1987 trans Thomas McCarthy) 356. 
31 Posocco, op. cit., n. 13, p. 250. 
32 F. Fanon, ‘Algeria Unveiled’, in F. Fanon, A Dying Colonialism, (1965) 62-63. 
33 M. Hélie-Lucas, ‘Women, Nationalism and Religion in the Algerian Liberation Struggle’, in Rethinking Fanon ed 
N.C. Gibson (1999), 275-276. 
34 Fanon, op. cit., n. 33, p. 62. 
35 B. Stasi, Laïcité et République: Rapport de la Commission de Réflexion sur l’application du principe de laïcité dans 
la République remis au Président de la République le 11 décembre 2003 (2004) and Jean-Louis Debré, La Laïcité à 
l’école un principe républicain à réaffirmer. Rapport No. 1275, 2 vols. (2003). 
36 C. Delphy, Separate and Dominate: Feminism and Racism after the War on Terror (2015 Trans. D Broder). 142. 
37 M. Fernando, ‘Exceptional citizens: Secular Muslim women and the politics of difference in France’, (2009) 17:4 
Social Anthropology/Anthropologie sociale, 379, at 380. 
38 B. Stasi, cited in E Terray, ‘L’Hystérie politique’, in Le Foulard islamique en questions, ed Nordmann (2004) 113. 
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be conceived of apart from gender equality. Such reasoning was again instrumental in justifying 
the 2010 prohibition on full-face coverings in French public space, thus reflecting the colonial 
impulses of the past in contemporary domestic legislation.  
 
The stipulation in the 2010 law that full-face coverings are prohibited in public space not only 
defines public space very broadly,39 but also intrinsically binds the 2010 law to the French concept 
of the nation.40 Public space in France has been described as an idiosyncratic ‘third space’ 
where belonging to the French national political community and national citizenship are realised.41 
This third space facilitates liberal secularism in France, enjoys priority over individual liberties 
and is based on the reduction of religious belief to a private choice. The French state thus stipulates 
a very specific kind of religious freedom as opposed to a generic one.42 This is a religious freedom 
that discloses an inherent Islamophobia. 
 
For McCrea legislative prohibitions such as French law 2010-1192 represent legal rules stepping 
in to replace the dissolution of cultural consensus on religious dress in ever-diversifying 
societies.43 Prohibiting Islamic dress is therefore supported by many who are sincere in their 
egalitarianism and  support for tolerance and liberalism.44 On this understanding, legal prohibitions 
are integral to the successful functioning of the French republic to ensure the open interaction of 
citizens on a liberal basis. 45 Prohibitions on Islamic dress are thus considered to embody the three 
central republican ideals of individual autonomy, whereby women are emancipated from 
oppressive  religious belief; secular equality, which considers a religion-free public sphere the best 
way to respect all citizens; and national cohesion, which considers religious signs as “ostentatious” 
symbols of divisiveness and evidence of insufficient integration of minorities into French national 
                                                          
39 C. Laborde, ‘State Paternalism and religious dress code’, (2012) 10:2 International J. of Constitutional Law, 398, 
p.  406. 
40 Amiraux & Koussens, op. cit., n. 25, p. 5. 
41 id., 9. 
42 Laborde, op. cit., n. 40, p.  400. 
43 R. McCrea, ‘The Ban on the Veil and European Law’, (2013) 13:1 Human Rights Law Rev., 57, at 58. 
44 id., p. 58. 
45 P. Weil, ‘Why the French laïcité is liberal’, (2009) 30:6 Cardozo Law Rev., 2714. 
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community.46 Prohibitions on Islamic dress are thus a method to realise the political republican 
model of France and its foundation in social cohesion as assimilation.47 
 
The defensiveness demonstrated by the French state through criminalising Islamic dress evidences 
the attachment of the colonial past to the present and future; it is a manifestation of the failure of 
the historical project of French colonialism. French colonialism was a project of cultural and 
educational transformation of indigènes into French citizen subjects. The French colonial project 
in Algeria was fundamentally entwined with the 1848 French revolution. At the birth of the second   
French republic in 1848, Algeria was made an integral part of France and subjected to 
administrative reform that extended French power across Algeria.48 Assimilation, far from being 
a contemporary critique of French policy in relation to minority, migrant, Muslim communities, 
was the self-confessed colonial method of the French state in the nineteenth century, whereby 
natives had to endure a cultural civilisation, ‘France’s mission civilisatrice’, before being 
considered for French naturalisation.49 This colonising agenda therefore constitutes part of the self-
image of the French republican model and cuts to the heart of the French concept of the nation. 
Islamic dress and the presence of colonial subjects in French public space on their own terms are 
not only an affront to the fundamental pillars of the republic but also a symbol of the failure of the 
French colonial project and the assimilationist project of the French nation. Colonial subjects are 
being punished for their failure to assimilate precisely because this evidences the failure of the 
French republic to assert its power and colonise the culture, education and epistemologies of the 
indigènes. 
 
THE LOGIC OF GENDER OPPRESSION 
 
In the context of the French Islamic dress debate, the unresolvable, inconsistent and repetitive use 
of gender oppression as a representational logic50 in justifying prohibitions on Islamic dress needs 
                                                          
46 Laborde, op. cit., n. 40, p. 398. 
47 Mullally, op. cit., n. 8, p. 36. 
48 E. Bleich, ‘The legacies of history? Colonization and immigrant integration in Britain and France’ (2005) Theory 
and Society, 34, 171 at 174. 
49 P. Lorcin, Imperial Identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in Colonial Algeria (1995) 7.  
50 A. Al-Saji, ‘The racialization of Muslim veils: A philosophical analysis’ (2010) Philosophy and Social Criticism 36(8) 
875, at 876. 
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to be contested. This does not set aside substantiated concerns relating to gender oppression but 
rather challenges the manner in which gender oppression is employed as a diversion in the 
discourse around prohibitions on Islamic dress and is thus made complicit in French neocolonial 
agendas. The logic of gender oppression is fundamental to state strategies in legislating on Islamic 
dress by creating public-political and legal debates that obfuscate wider political and economic 
aims including the ongoing management of colonial bodies.  
 
Fernando has identified secular Muslim women who support prohibitions on full-face coverings 
as ‘exceptional subjects’ in French public space. These women have translated their presence in 
French public space into political positions, notably the lobby group ni putes ni soumises. 51  They 
consider they have cast off the chains of patriarchal Islam and speak on behalf of their sisters who 
have been silenced by Islamic fundamentalists.52 In so doing they embrace the secular, universal 
values of liberty, equality and tolerance so fundamental to the French republic, arguing that veiling 
signifies the gender oppression of Muslim women through Islam and denouncing the way in which 
Islam treats women.53 These feminists call for veiled women to quit their backward religion and 
oppression and to wake up to western values and rationalism.54 Some suggest that there is a causal 
link between veiling and rape.55 For Leila Ahmed feminism in this incarnation has been co-opted 
as ‘an instrument of colonial domination’.56 Similarly, Mohanty has analysed how western 
feminisms in this form appropriate and colonise the experience of ‘third world women’.  In these 
forms of feminism power is exercised through the discursive homogenisation of the experience of 
Muslim women.57 Mernissi has argued persuasively that the current restrictions imposed on 
                                                          
51 Fernando, op. cit., n. 38, p. 381. 
52 id., p. 380. 
53 Organisations such as ni putes ni soumises, Translated as: Neither Whores Nor Submissive < 
http://www.npns.fr/>; Élisabeth Badinter and Sihem Habchi president of ni putes ni soumises, ‘Interdire le voile 
integral au nom de la dignité de la personne’, Liberation, 9 September 2009 
<www.liberation.fr/societe/0101589842-interdire-le-voile-integral-au-nom-de-la-dignite-de-lapersonne> ; the 
Collectif nationale des droits des femmes adopt a pro-ban position refusing veiled women access to meetings and 
stopping them participating in International Women’s Day marches in 2004/2005.; 
<https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/womens-blog/2015/jul/20/france-feminism-hijab-ban-muslim-
women> 
54 S. Silvestri, Europe’s Muslim Women: potential aspirations and challenges: Research Report, City University 
London and Cambridge University (2008) 26. 
55 L. Kandel, ‘Un foulard qui provoque d’étranges cécités’, Le Monde, 8 July 2003, cited in Delphy, op. cit., n. 37, p. 
143. 
56 L. Ahmed, Women and Gender in Islam (1992) 237. 
57 C. Mohanty, ‘Feminist Scholarship and Colonial Discourses’, (1988) 30 Feminist Rev., 61, at 63. 
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Muslim women, including Islamic dress, unduly hinder Muslim women in pursuing a full life.58 
Mernissi does not attribute this oppression to Islam, but rather to the instrumental, political 
appropriation of the sacred text of Islam, the Quran, by a tradition of misogyny that appropriates 
Islamic dress and the hijab as a curtain and tool of oppression.59 Others argue that Islamic dress is 
an autonomous choice that must be protected through human rights law.60 More specifically in the 
French context, others stress the contrary meanings of Islamic dress and in particular its use as a 
protest in the face of growing racism.61 
 
Some scholars have argued that gender oppression as a justification for restricting Islamic dress is 
not specific to the French context.62 Undoubtedly, the gender oppression justification for unveiling 
transcends spatial and temporal boundaries and is invoked in many different geo-political contexts. 
However, the way in which this argument holds as a universal truth that Islamic dress is an 
unequivocal symbol of gender oppression through Islam, is very specifically employed in the 
French context as inimical to the values of the French republic. As early as 1989, French 
intellectuals intervened stating that if French society tolerated the Islamic headscarf as ‘a symbol 
of women’s submission… free rein [is given] to their fathers and brothers…the harshest patriarchy 
on the planet’.63 The appropriation of women’s rights and a discourse of feminism in support of 
restrictions on Islamic dress has been very successful in France. Delphy has described how these 
pro-ban feminist arguments are in fact politicians’ arguments.64 Indeed, French feminist Élisabeth 
Badinter started a petition amongst French intellectuals to ban the full-face veil through law.65 
Delphy has explained that the gender oppression justification for restricting Islamic dress became 
all the more integral due to the weak nature of the secularist argument in justifying these 
                                                          
58 F. Mernissi, Women and Islam: An Historical and Theological Enquiry (1991 trans Mary Jo Lakeland). 
59 id., p. 85. 
60 J. Marshall ‘Conditions for Freedom? European Human Rights Law and the Islamic Headscarf Debate’ (2008) 30 
Human Rights Q., 631. 
61 F. Gaspard and F. Khorokhavar, Le Foulard et la République, (1995) cited in Delphy, op. cit., n. 37, p. 136. 
62 Al-Saji, op. cit., n. 51, p. 876. 
63Élisabeth Badinter, Régis Debray, Alain Finkielkraut, Élisabeth de Fontenay and Katarine Kintzler identified by 
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restrictions.66 She highlighted how suddenly, in 2003, gender equality became the defining pillar 
of the French republic. The equality of women was thereby transformed into a foundational pillar 
of the French republic which transcended political divides. This narrative dominated public-
political discourse preceding the criminalisation of the full-face veil. French justice minister, 
Michèle Alliot-Marie stated that the vote to ban full-face coverings in public was a success for the 
republic, working towards the values of gender equality and against those who push for inequality 
and injustice. 67 Bérengère Poletti, of Sarkozy's centre-right UMP party similarly claimed that 
women in full veils wore ‘a sign of alienation on their faces’ and had to be ‘liberated’.68 André 
Gerin of the Communist opposition compared the veil to ‘a walking coffin, a muzzle’.69  
 
The strategic use of the gender oppression argument in contemporary France speaks over time to 
reveal an enduring and specifically French colonial, political agenda; indeed France was the first 
country to criminalise visibly Muslim women.70 Legally, the dignity and equality of women 
form the foundations of most arguments in favour of prohibiting Islamic dress.71 Fanon described 
how during the Algerian Revolution of 1958, the French army publicly and forcefully unveiled 
Muslim women,  exclaiming “Vive l’Algerie française!”.72 Such action speaks through the years 
to the incident witnessed on the beach in Nice and other incidents experienced by Muslim women 
in contemporary France, where French citizens have felt empowered to tear Islamic dress from 
women in the street. This enforced physical unveiling or ‘burka rage’73 has been diagnosed in the 
United Kingdom as a hate crime,74 disclosing a heavily gendered dimension in targeting Muslim 
women only.75 As was the case during the French colonisation of Algeria, the act of unveiling these 
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women to control populations and exert power remains the strategy in contemporary France 
resulting in a neocolonialism that was clear to see on the beach in Nice. 
 
The Islamic dress as gender oppression narrative has been heavily critiqued by postcolonial 
feminists as embodying the notion of white man saves brown woman from brown men.76 
Thisnarrative paints women as victims without agency and implies a barbarism on the part of wider 
Muslim communities and Muslim men. It suggests that Islam subjects women to gender oppression 
in worse ways than other religions and cultures with recurring narratives of arranged marriages, 
honour killings and Islamic dress.77 Islam is thus painted as ‘a barbaric source of women’s 
inequality’, 78 whereby Islamic dress is the tool of this inequality. This narrative imposes a meaning 
on Islamic dress that disregards the complexity and nuance of the practice and the meaning given 
to it by those women who wear it. Moreover, this narrative obfuscates and perpetuates a French 
neocolonialism. 
 
 
THE LOGIC OF SECURITY 
 
Gender oppression does not act alone in obfuscating the colonial narrative. Arguably more 
powerful and effective in this role is the logic of security manifested in a terrorism narrative and 
the threat to public safety that Islamic dress has come to signify. In the French context, the Charlie 
Hebdo shootings,79 the Bataclan theatre attack,80 the Nice attack and the Trèbes shootings81 have 
fuelled this narrative of a state at war with Islamic terror elements that threaten national security.82 
The logic of security thus steps in to the Islamic dress debate as a diversion to obscure neocolonial 
agendas that are implemented without question or critique. 
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National security justifications are symptomatic of the diversification of society whereby 
misgivings about Islam in French society are accentuated by the emergence of 
‘communities…who do not feel bound by the compromises laboriously developed over the last 
century  between cathos and laïcques’.83 Brown has explored how this feeling of being threatened 
leads to a phenomenon characterised by building physical and metaphorical walls around states in 
times of waning sovereignty.84 Fernando has applied this general impulse to the French context by 
describing the control of the sexuality of Muslim women through prohibitions on clothing as a 
reassertion of the French republic in neoliberal times of declining sovereignty.85  
 
The focus on Islamic dress as the symbol of a terrorist threat represents the politicisation of Islamic 
dress and the bodies of those who wear it.  Marine Le Pen relied on this narrative to build her 
platform for the French presidential election, proposing the eradication of fundamentalist Islam. 
The method proposed to combat this terrorist threat was a blanket ban on the full-face Islamic veil  
as  contrary to the principle of gender equality.86 This seamless conflation of terrorism and gender 
equality betrays a reasoned, robust account of Islamic dress as a signifier of either of these logics 
but is successful at entrenching a powerful terror/security/public order narrative as determinative 
of the public-political discourse around Islamic dress. This narrative interacts in a gendered 
manner with the perception of Muslim women in everyday encounters affecting access to the 
workplace, healthcare and education thus structurally entrenching discrimination.  
 
Islamic dress and the regulation of the bodies of Muslim women thereby become the tools of 
revived imperial and neocolonial agendas that seek to produce a ‘derogatory stereotype, of other, 
alien, subordinated societies’.87 As Said explained in Orientalism88, Islam is often talked about in 
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essentialist clichés that are based upon a seventeenth century ideal of Islam.89 Stereotypes are 
generated of Muslims as retrogressive and immune to change. This paranoia manifests in increased 
criminalisation of Islamic dress and the proliferation of terrorism laws such as the French state of 
emergency laws put in place in 2015 following the Bataclan attack. The 2015 French state of 
emergency laws are fundamentally attached to French colonialism as they replicate the use of 
emergency laws that transferred power to the military to overcome and combat resistance to French 
colonial power during the Algerian war of independence of 1955.90 The colonial impulse and 
genesis of French state of emergency powers is thus reiterated in contemporary France through 
heightened terror laws and the criminalisation of Islamic dress. For Neocleous the state of 
emergency is the status quo. State emergency powers constitute ‘an ongoing aspect of normal 
political rule’.91 Emergency powers emerge from within the rule of law and are as important to the 
political management of the modern state as the rule of law itself; they are what is used when the 
rule of law needs to be overcome. 92 The French state of emergency laws have been widely 
acknowledged to disregard the law, unduly restricting and eroding the liberties of certain targeted 
individuals and groups through regulations such as prohibitions on burkinis. These laws are 
justified in the name of national security. National security is the logic of the state of emergency.93 
In this context Islamic dress is considered as a signifier of terrorism, a threat, resistance to French 
colonial power and an ‘anti-West posture’.94 For Edwards, Islamic dress ‘has become the site of 
contemporary political struggle’.95 The body of the Muslim woman wearing Islamic dress has 
become territorialised as the site of political disputes over church and state relations, identity and 
secularism. 96  National security territorialises the body of the Muslim woman in an attempt to 
reinforce the waning sovereignty of the French state. National security thus acts in a gendered 
manner to specifically target Muslim women the result of which is the colonisation of the body of 
the Muslim woman by French administrative power. 
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The logics of security and gender oppression divert attention away from the neocolonial 
substratum of the debate around Islamic dress and are transposed on to the body that wears Islamic 
dress. These two constructions of Muslim women act as ‘avatars’97 in the public-political 
imaginary as the body of the Muslim woman becomes responsibilised for perpetuating gender 
oppression and a threat to national security. The result of this responsibilisation is that she is 
targeted by the state through criminalisation and by civic society through ever more prevalent hate 
crime.98 Blame for civic tensions within French society and an increased threat to national security 
is directed individually at the visibly Muslim woman, obfuscating the structural, (neo)colonial 
source of tensions and alleviating the French state and the history of colonialism of any blame.  
The logics of security and gender oppression perform the political role of redirecting blame from 
the state and colonialism to the Muslim woman. These logics are tightly woven together such that 
each can be used to justify the other in a self-perpetuating method that reinforces this imaginary.  
 
 
THE INSTRUMENTAL ROLE OF LAW: FRANCE 
 
French domestic and ECHR law have been instrumentalised to facilitate a French political agenda 
of assimilation and management of colonial bodies. For Delphy the French law criminalising 
Islamic dress is a rejection of French descendants of colonial subjects in response to increased 
demands for full legal citizenship and recognition  by the state.99  De Sousa Santos has argued that 
international law and mainstream human rights doctrines guarantee the continuity of the radical 
exclusions of colonialism.100 Political and legal debates on Islamic dress are therefore intrinsically 
entwined one with another such that law is instrumentally employed as the tool of political 
posturing.  
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The ongoing Islamic dress controversy in France began in 1989 when three girls were expelled 
from school for wearing headscarves. This was followed in 1994 by a decree from the French 
Minister of Education, François Bayrou that ostentatious signs of religious affiliation were to be 
prohibited in schools. Islamic dress was considered ostentatious and in itself proselytising. 
Consequently 69 girls were expelled from schools for wearing “veils”.101 Controversy continued 
in the 1990s and 2000s, evidenced by French law 2004-228, which was enacted banning 
‘conspicuous religious symbols’ in schools. This law was widely acknowledged to be aimed at 
Muslim girls wearing headscarves. Scott has exposed how these three episodes of ‘l’affaire du 
foulard’ coincided with government initiatives to increase integration within French society.102  
 
The controlling of women wearing full-face coverings can be traced back to 2008 when the French 
Conseil d’Etat refused citizenship to a 32-year-old Moroccan resident because her full-face veil 
constituted a lack of assimilation.103 Her ‘radical practice’ of Islam was considered incompatible 
with French values, community and gender equality. In response right-wing politicians called for 
a ban on the full-face veil. The debate escalated in 2009 when Communist party mayor, André 
Gérin, claimed that the full-face veil represented an anti-French, anti-white struggle that threatened 
laicité and thus legislation was required.104 The result was French law 2010-1192, criminalising 
full-face coverings in French public space. As the long list of exceptions carved out by the Conseil 
d’Etat highlights, 105  this law was and is specifically aimed at Muslim women. In 2014, the French 
Cour de Cassation held in the Baby Loup case that a nursery had acted lawfully in requiring an 
employee to remove her jilbab, which does not cover the face, at work.106  
 
The restriction on the beach in Nice focused on ‘correct dress, respectful of accepted customs and 
secularism, as well as rules of hygiene and of safety in public bathing areas’.107 A similar ban in 
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Cannes was first challenged at the local level, where the court upheld the prohibition arguing that 
the burkini could create a risk to public order. The ban was ultimately suspended in a test case 
decided on Friday 26 August 2016 by the French Conseil d’Etat,108 the highest administrative court 
in France. The Conseil d’Etat stated that the restriction of fundamental rights manifested in the 
prohibition on the burkini had to be justified by an actual risk to public order, rather than by 
recourse to other considerations.109 The court stated that no actual risk to public order was 
present.110 In the wake of this decision, the Collective against Islamophobia in France called on 
the mayors of 30 other French cities to remove similar bans. Despite these calls and the decision 
of the Conseil d’Etat, the mayors of various municipalities defiantly maintained the bans. The 
League of Human Rights in France vowed to challenge these bans one by one. The French Prime 
Minister, Manuel Valls, suggested that naked breasts better represent the French republic than do 
headscarves. At the time of writing, a rule prohibiting the burkini on the French island of Corsica 
had been upheld by a local court,111 citing the nebulous concept of the risk to ‘public order’ as 
justifying the ban.  
In a further ruling of 26 September 2016, the Conseil d’Etat considered the Nice prohibition. The 
French League of Human Rights and the Collective against Islamophobia in France argued that the 
mayor of Cagnes-sur-Mer had exceeded his powers by prohibiting burkinis or ostensibly religious 
dress on the beach. The court considered the prohibition was in breach of the fundamental liberties 
of freedom of movement, freedom of conscience and personal freedom. The Conseil d’Etat 
suspended the prohibition and struck down the judgment of the administrative tribunal of Nice, 
which had upheld the ban at first instance.112 The justification given by the Nice tribunal was that 
the measure was put in place to prevent disturbances to public order. The Conseil d’Etat stated that 
even given the recent terror attacks and ongoing state of emergency in Nice, the risk to public order 
was not great enough to warrant a legal order. As such,  the mayor had exceeded his powers.113 On  
                                                          
108 Le Conseil d’Etat, CE ordonnance du 26 août 2016, Nos 402742, 402777  <http://www.conseil-etat.fr/Decisions-
Avis-Publications/Decisions/Selection-des-decisions-faisant-l-objet-d-une-communication-particuliere/CE-
ordonnance-du-26-aout-2016-Ligue-des-droits-de-l-homme-et-autres-association-de-defense-des-droits-de-l-
homme-collectif-contre-l-islamophobie-en-France>. 
109 id., para 5. 
110 id., para 6. 
111 ‘Burkini ban issued on French island of Corsica upheld by court’, The Guardian, 6 September 2016 
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/06/burkini-ban-corsica-upheld-by-french-court>.  
112 Le Conseil d’Etat, op. cit., n. 1. 
113 id., para 6. 
19 
 
8 June 2017, the mayor of Lorette (Loire) established an administrative rule explicitly prohibiting 
monokinis, burkinis and veils  on the beach.114 At first instance the administrative tribunal of Lyon 
struck down the rule and ordered the municipality of Lorette to pay each petitioning human rights 
organisation compensation.115 The municipality of Lorette challenged this decision at the Conseil 
d’Etat, which rejected the appeal and upheld the decision of the administrative tribunal.116  
 
The gender oppression justification for prohibiting Islamic dress is largely absent from the text of 
the French judgments quashing municipal orders. This enabledthe courts to avoid making normative 
statements about the link between Islamic dress and gender equality. Consequently, the Conseil 
d’Etat was able to quash the municipal bans on Islamic dress and overrule the lower French courts 
without going against dominant public discourse in France, which considers Islamic dress to be 
symbolic of the gender oppression of Islam.  Instead, the court picked up the logic of national 
security as public order and quashed the municipal bans on the basis that, even if a prohibition would 
be justified in pursuit of public order, the disturbance or risk posed by burkinis was not proven in 
these instances. In these rulings the Conseil d’Etat sent a clear political message to the French 
administration and civil society by quashing the burkini bans and overruling first instance judgments, 
that rules with such discriminatory intent and effect were unacceptable. Despite the lack of 
substantive, explicit analysis of discrimination in the judgments of the Conseil d’Etat, the action of 
the court to remove the bans was more powerful than the words of the judgments in these cases. 
 
THE INSTRUMENTAL ROLE OF RIGHTS: THE ECtHR 
 
A parallel and intertwining narrative to the national French jurisprudence was in the meantime 
unfolding at the ECtHR, which until 2005 had declared all applications on the issue of Islamic 
dress inadmissible.117 It is important to stress that the ECtHR narrative was not merely parallel to 
the French case law but facilitated the French pursuit of colonial and neocolonial assimilationist 
policies through law.  In its early admissibility decisions, the ECtHR established a necessary 
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connection between Islamic dress and gender oppression, stating that the hijab was grounded in a 
principle in the Quran that was ‘hard to square with the principle of gender equality’.118 It was on 
this basis that the jurisprudence developed. In Sahin v Turkey veiling was considered a practice 
‘synonymous with the alienation of women’. 119 However, as Judge Tulkens asked: ‘what, in fact, 
is the connection between the ban and sexual equality? The judgment does not say.’120 For 
Dembour, the ECtHR’s statements about the relationship between gender equality, the veil and 
religious fundamentalism were ‘gratuitous’ and not reasoned adequately.121 The ECtHR invoked 
the narrative of “saving” these women who are thus ‘paraded as the objects of the conduct of 
uncivilised states justifying at least in part, punitive action by the civilised’.122 The victim 
discourse around these applicants was not borne out in reality. These were independent working, 
or studying, women who had pursued their claims to wear Islamic dress to the highest level. 
Despite this factual context, the necessary link between Islam and gender oppression identified by 
the court became reified as fact in subsequent jurisprudence and was therefore not questioned or 
investigated from a critical perspective but rather used to justify future decisions.  
The Sahin judgment developed the notion of the risk to public order and security as justifying 
headscarf bans, despite that risk being largely unfounded,123 and insisted on the necessary 
connection between secularism and democracy. The ECtHR upheld the Article 9 violation in Sahin 
as justified since the right to manifest religion or belief may be restricted to ensure that everyone's 
beliefs are respected.  In the 2008 case of El Morsli v France124 the ECtHR declared the application 
inadmissible  on the basis that ‘security reasons’ outweighed the applicant’s right to refuse to 
remove her foulard islamique on religious grounds. 125  This decision demonstrated a logic that 
posits Islam against the West embodying secularism as a fear of Islam.126 Two further ECtHR 
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cases concerning France were decided in 2008 prior to the criminalisation of the full-face veil.127 
Both judgments followed a Șahin interpretation whereby the infringements of the applicants’ 
Article 9 rights were justified by the aim of pursuing secularism, public order, and the rights and 
freedoms of others. 
 
In the 2014 case of SAS v France the applicant challenged French law 2010-1192 on the basis of 
articles 3, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In this 
judgment the ECtHR dismissed the claims under articles 3, 10 and 11 and concentrated on articles 
8, 9 and 14 and most specifically on article 9, the right to freedom of religion. The gender 
oppression argument so fundamental to the ECtHR’s early decision making128 in this area was 
ostensibly rejected along with security justifications.129 The ECtHR was not prepared to consider 
that the French law banning full-face coverings in public space pursued these points as legitimate 
interests. Instead, justification for the criminalisation of visibly Muslim women shifted from the 
familiar, specific arguments of gender oppression and security to the more general discourse of the 
‘far-fetched and vague’ concept of ‘living together’. 130 Living together is not a concept formerly 
recognised by the interpretive method of the ECtHR, nor is it found in the text of the ECHR. It 
does not appear as part of limitation clauses in articles 8(2) or 9(2) however the ECtHR employed 
a descriptive sleight of hand and found that living together constituted part of ‘the protection of 
rights and freedoms of others’, a phrase found in the text of articles 8 and 9, and thus held that the 
applicant’s right could be limited on this basis.131 Contrary to the impression created by the 
ECtHR’s reasoning, the catch-all term ‘living together’ did not jettison the gender oppression and 
security justifications so integral to the French government’s argument and dominant public-
political discourse in France. Rather, the notion of ‘living together’ perpetuated these dominant 
narratives as forming part of a French way of life. This judgment made normative a French way 
of living and a French citizen subject that was untouched by the persuasive critiques put forward 
to challenge the fidelity of the logics of gender oppression and security in justifying restrictions 
on Islamic dress. The French government was called to account for prohibiting Islamic dress and 
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the process of human rights review was performed, justice was seen to be done. Despite this 
illusion of justice, the ECtHR enabled the French government to maintain issues of postcolonial 
assimilation as a domestic matter. The ECtHR’s adoption of the notion of ‘living together’ 
implicitly endorsed an assimilationist agenda that requires Muslim communities to assimilate 
according to the values of the French republic.  
 
The French government argued that a violation of the applicant’s right to manifest her religion was 
justified because of public safety and ‘respect for the minimum set of values of an open and 
democratic society’.132 This minimum set of values included gender equality, human dignity and 
living together. These three elements identified in the submissions of the French government are 
the three central republican ideals of individual autonomy, secular equality and national cohesion 
translated into the language of the ECtHR and represented the strategic misappropriation of the 
foundational pillars of the French republic to justify restrictions on Islamic dress. 133  Whilst 
national security does not appear explicitly in these values, it is the concomitant of living together 
and national cohesion and is thus present in the judgment. National security is what protects the 
cohesive national political community from those who threaten its unity.  
 
The French government expressed surprise at the ‘highly positive representation’ of Islamic dress 
presented by the applicant and third-party interveners.134  According to the French government 
Islamic dress effaced women from public space, pushed them into a ‘private family space or to an 
exclusively female space’ and thus could not be considered consonant with human dignity as it 
excluded Muslim women from the social contract.135 The French government’s arguments 
represented what Brown has described as human rights as a tactic of governance and 
domination.136 It is  the French law that erased these women from public discourse by not allowing 
them to participate in society on their own terms and decide their  future. If one among many 
interpretations of Islamic dress is that it is a curtain to society, prohibiting Islamic dress acts as a 
double discrimination in eliminating Muslim women from the public sphere altogether.  
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The human rights law of the ECtHR was thereby invoked instrumentally to achieve the political 
ends of the French republic and engender a strategic narrative in the public psyche that is hostile 
to colonial subjects. Legislative restrictions on Islamic dress were debated in public-political 
arenas, which meant that the political imperatives of the French republic and the various 
(mis)interpretations of its foundational pillars became enshrined in statute. Law became 
instrumentalised as the vehicle for the highly specific political aim of assimilating migrant 
communities and maintaining a status quo in the management of colonial bodies within 
France.137The genesis of ‘living together’ is inherently rooted in a French concept of the nation 
that promotes national cohesion at the cost of cultural and religious diversity and considers 
religious dress a divisive sign of lack of integration of minority communities.  Through law, 
communities are forced to conform to a univocal concept of citizenship, which is paternalistically 
imposed by the state. Through law, markers of diversification from the republican norm are 
efficiently erased. Politics and law are inextricably linked in the Islamic dress debate. The enduring 
French colonial political agenda drives a public-political discourse premised on a politics of fear 
and characterised by the logics of gender oppression and security, obfuscating the colonial impulse 
at the heart of restrictions on Islamic dress. This creates a climate of Islamophobia and the requisite 
public-political consensus to pass laws banning Islamic dress through legitimate democratic 
processes.  
 
The intertwined nature of national political debates and the role of law in the Islamic dress debate 
was reiterated in SAS by the wide margin of appreciation afforded to France.138 The margin of 
appreciation is the ‘room for maneouvre’139 afforded to states in the implementation of ECHR 
rights. The margin represents the political and legal compromise that is the genesis of the ECHR 
system.140 The margin enables the court to avoid confrontation with national governments in 
politically sensitive cases by deferring to domestic policies and can thus be understood as a 
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political tool or a mode of governance.141  The margin of appreciation is a necessary compromise 
to ensure the ongoing political legitimacy of the ECHR system, which at its inception was a 
political-diplomatic union between states. When political compromise must be made to ensure the 
continued legitimacy of the ECHR system, it is the individual legal rights of the most vulnerable 
that are restricted.142  At the time of SAS, the ECHR system was and continues to be experiencing 
a political age of subsidiarity,143 where human rights as a diplomatic arrangement overrides human 
rights as individual rights. Saul has demonstrated how the SAS judgment in particular, depicts a 
deepening of the ECtHR’s concept of subsidiarity and the extent to which national parliamentary 
processes feature in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence via the margin of appreciation.144  
 
The wide margin afforded to France was justified by the  democratic process that preceded 
adoption of the law.145 However, as Berry has  identified, reliance on democratic process does not 
per se justify restrictions on minority rights,146 a point established by the ECtHR  in Young, James 
and Webster v United Kingdom.147 The wide margin afforded to France was inconsistent with the 
ECtHR’s recognition that the flexibility inherent in the notion of living together could have 
resulted in the risk of abuse and this must be mitigated by ‘a careful examination of the impugned 
limitation’.148 The ECtHR expressed concerns acknowledging that Islamophobic remarks had 
littered the debate leading up to the adoption of the law banning full-face coverings.149 On notice 
of a pervasive Islamophobia in the French political debate, the ECtHR should have carried out an 
examination of the utmost care. Had the court done so it would have uncovered a democratic 
process characterised by the above-analysed debates of gender oppression and national security, 
two logics that the court explained in SAS it was not prepared to recognise as legitimate interests. 
As the dissenting opinion emphasised, whilst ‘the “values of the French Revolution”’ were 
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relevant to the ECtHR’s decision, especially given the ‘overwhelming political consensus’ 
preceding adoption of the law’,150  it remained the court’s role to ‘protect small minorities against 
disproportionate interferences’.151  
 
The French interior ministry stated that the law in question would affect 2000 of France’s 64 
million population.152 To withstand human rights scrutiny at the ECtHR, a measure must be 
proportionate. This is tested by identifying a legitimate aim; in the above cases this aim has been 
interchangeably, security, gender oppression, secularism, and now living together. The second part 
of the test assesses whether such a measure is proportionate to the aim pursued. Taking the above 
figures into consideration, the criminalisation of full-face coverings is, from a legal perspective, 
disproportionate. The ECtHR itself noted the small number of Muslim women that this law would 
be relevant to. The French government maintained that this law was neutral.153 However the fact 
that punishment for contravention include taking a citizenship test belies the discriminatory intent 
of the law and exposes law 2010-1192 as deeply rooted in an assimilationist agenda. 
Throughout the judgment the ECtHR emphasised pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness as the 
markers of a democratic society.154 Following this reasoning, one might have expected the court 
to find that a blanket ban limiting the rights of a small minority group to wear Islamic dress would 
be considered intolerant, narrow-minded and homogenising. The court nevertheless found that 
there had been no violation of the applicant’s article 9 right to manifest her religion thereby 
legitimising the criminalisation of full-face coverings in France. As the dissenting opinion argued, 
the blanket ban on full-face coverings could be considered a ‘sign of selective pluralism and 
restricted tolerance’ by eliminating the cause of tension between the majority in France and the 
small minority.155  This is a criticism that has historically been raised in the court’s jurisprudence 
on Islamic dress. It was observed in Sahin that the headscarf ban in question sought to ‘eliminate 
the cause of tension by doing away with pluralism’.156 The repetitive nature of this criticism would 
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suggest that SAS presented an opportunity for the ECtHR to address this issue. The fact that the 
ECtHR chose not to indicates that this is political decision making.   
In a political climate of subsidiarity that challenges the legitimacy of the ECtHR from the 
perspective of national sovereignty, it is doubtful that the ECtHR could have done anything other 
than accommodate the French prohibition on full-face coverings. This places political compromise 
and the legitimacy of the ECHR system before the rights of those who wear Islamic dress. The 
ECtHR therefore finds itself stuck between a political rock and a legal hard place. Had the ECtHR 
annulled the French ban, the political support afforded to the ECHR system by the French 
government would have been compromised. However, in securing the legitimacy of the ECHR 
system via a wide margin of appreciation, the ECHR fails to protect the most vulnerable in society, 
thus revealing an inherent flaw in the ECHR system. At the time of writing, the UN Human Rights 
Committee had published two decisions contradicting and condemning the ECtHR approach in 
SAS.157 The Committee stated that French law 2010-1192 does in fact infringe the rights of Muslim 
women. 
The above examination exposes an assimilationist project through law and the instrumental 
appropriation of law to achieve strategic political goals. This is not a novel contemporary moment, 
but rather an ongoing colonial project. Rancière has contested the narrative that September 11 
marked a symbolic rupture in the political order and has explained how attributing a new world of 
terror post September 11 eliminates political reflection on the practices of Western states, 
reinforcing civilisation’s continuous war with terror.158 That much is evident in the ECtHR’s 
deference to French national political agendas in SAS. Characteristic of this symbolisation of lack 
of politics is the eclipse of an identity that is inclusive of alterity. The erasure of colonial markers 
effected by the French law prohibiting face coverings manufactures this eclipse in identity. 
Pertinent to the analysis of legal measures around Islamic dress is Rancière’s identification of a 
growing indetermination of the juridical, where facts are identified through consensus or justified 
through arguments relating to terrorism, most obviously national security and public order.  
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These methods are present in the Islamic dress jurisprudence, where ‘European consensus’ is the 
mode of decision making. Consensus features significantly in SAS in the majority’s justification 
for granting a wide margin of appreciation on account of the overwhelming political consensus 
that underpinned the democratic process preceding adoption of the legal ban. The fact that this 
consensus was characterised by Islamophobia and grounded in neocolonial agendas was not 
addressed by the majority and, although hinted at, the ECtHR avoided a substantive examination 
of the issue of Islamophobia and its neocolonial implications.  
 
INSTITUTIONAL ISLAMOPHOBIA AND THE WHITENESS OF FRENCH PUBLIC 
SPACE 
 
As the analysis thus far has established the instrumental use of the law of the ECHR creates the 
political space for French domestic laws that target, regulate and criminalise the bodies of Muslim 
women. This legal-normative institutionalisation of Islamophobia is manifested in the censure of 
Islamic dress, which entrenches a whiteness of public space and institutions and represents the 
material use of the bodies of Muslim women to control wider communities through law. The 
instrumental use of law in this way governs not just bodies but also governs public space in pursuit 
of colonial agendas. Applying Keenan’s analysis to this context, law produces spaces where some 
subjects belong, and others do not by assuming that French public space is always already white 
and non-Muslim.159 The geo-political effect of the French law criminalising full-face dress in 
public spaces is to entrench French public space as white. This stops not-white bodies from 
flourishing and hinders the mobility of these bodies. With material and ideological foundations in 
French colonial past, present, and futures Islamophobia acts as a form of racism in targeting those 
who do not conform to the French univocal, assimilationist concept of citizenship.160  Together, 
the logics of gender oppression and security enable the French state to establish institutional 
Islamophobia and whiteness as the normative qualities of French public space. The bodies of 
Muslim women who do not correspond to such normative qualities are unwelcome in that space, 
unable to function and attract hostile attention. Institutional Islamophobia in France can thus be 
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considered as a neocolonial extension and effect of the property, economy and power imperatives 
of the French colonial project in Algeria, which, like law, consider space to be blank and ripe for 
the imposition of a particular socio-legal regime.161  
 
Fanon has described his own experience as the object of the hostile white gaze whereby ‘the 
corporeal schema crumbled, its place taken by the racial epidermal schema’.162 For Fanon, 
following Jaspers, this experience is contingent on existing concrete ‘legends, stories, history and 
above all historicity’.163 To be an object of the white gaze is for Fanon a specific moment where 
body is displaced by colour. To extrapolate Fanon’s observation and apply it to the experience of 
Muslim women in contemporary France, this same moment is present. Upon entering French 
public space Muslim women experience Islamophobia as the body is displaced by Islam. In this 
moment, Islamophobia acts as a form of racism.  As Ahmed has explained, the effect of this 
moment is that the body in question is ‘stopped’ in its tracks or negated.164 In contemporary France, 
the unveiling of Muslim women through legislation acts in the same way to interrupt or disorient 
the corporeal schema of the Muslim woman wearing Islamic dress.  
 
For Fanon, bodies are shaped by histories of colonialism. Colonialism makes the world white and 
this is a world that accepts certain kinds of bodies and puts certain objects within their reach. The 
‘body-at-home’ in this world is the white body. As Ahmed has explained, racism stops black 
bodies from inhabiting space by spreading itself through objects and others as the familiarity of 
the implicit white world. This situation “disorients” black bodies and reduces them to things among 
things. The result of the disorientation effected by racism is that it reduces capacities for action. 
Ahmed has built on Fanon’s insights to explore racism as an ‘unfinished history, which orientates 
bodies in specific directions, affecting how they “take up” space’.165 Ahmed’s insight is to explore 
how such orientations are crucial to how bodies inhabit space and to the racialisation of bodily, as 
well as social, space; specifically, how whiteness is produced in domestic and public spaces.166  
The requirement through law that French public space should be free from full-face coverings, 
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produces this whiteness of public space both metaphorically and literally by making public space 
inhospitable to Muslim women, their families and communities. 
 
Institutions are exposed as white by highlighting how ‘institutional spaces are shaped by the 
proximity of some bodies and not others: white bodies gather and cohere to form the edges of such 
spaces’.167 The institution of law brings this point into sharp focus in the context of Islamic dress 
in France by regulating public space to criminalise bodies for wearing Islamic dress. White bodies 
cohere around political institutions, debate, and democratic process to form the overwhelming 
consensus that led to the adoption of French law 2010-1192. This direction of time, energy and 
resources in regulating, criminalising, and policing the bodies of those wearing Islamic dress in 
French public space is a measure of how the West chooses to exercise power over the Orient.168  
Such administrative and legislative measures enshrine whiteness in French public space, 
simultaneously hindering the action of those bodies that are perceived to invade169 that white, non-
Muslim public space and legitimising the burka rage of those who fit that public space.  
 
This legal-normative institutionalisation of Islamophobia makes public space inaccessible to 
women wearing Islamic dress. Itaoui has shown through empirical research that Islamophobia as 
a form of racism experienced by young Muslims affects mobility and the use of public space by 
creating mental maps of exclusion.170 Laws criminalising Islamic dress or banning burkinis create 
legislative maps of exclusion and represent Islamophobia as racism in its institutional extreme. 
The effect of these laws is to stop the physical mobility of bodies, blocking the ability of not-white 
bodies to flourish through a form of segregation. Analytically, colonial bodies are pushed into the 
private sphere. Politically, colonial bodies are denied a voice as the objects of colonial 
management.  
Law acts instrumentally to perpetuate the whiteness of public space and entrench institutional 
Islamophobia. Bouamama has described this move through law as making racism respectable.171 
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The colonial condition echoes through French institutions. Past incursions on colonial bodies speak 
to the present to hinder the potential of those bodies now and into the future. The old legal category 
of colonial indigènes resurfaces in its contemporary form of institutional Islamophobia to 
criminalise Islamic dress in public spaces. This affects not just the ability of certain bodies to 
flourish but has geo-political consequences in terms of the use of space and decreased mobility of 
Muslim communities in public spaces, including the correlative lack of political mobilisation. Less 
considered is the psycho-sociological affect of this legal-normative Islamophobia for visibly 
Muslim women and Muslim communities, which results in alienation and reduced capacity for 
action. 
 
Onlookers on the beach in Nice reportedly applauded the armed police men for their efforts and 
shouted at the woman to go home. This discourse of ‘stranger danger’ is employed as a response 
to outsiders of a community, those who are not ‘at home’ and whose presence raises suspicion.172 
Muslim communities and visibly Muslim women have been subject to this discourse and alienated 
through their vilification in the press and society. Under such circumstances these communities 
and individuals protect their identities by recourse to defensive strategies. The alienation or 
singling out of the body that ‘could be Muslim’ results in the adoption of a ‘defensive posture as 
we “wait” for the line of racism to take our rights of passage away’.173 
 
CONCLUSION 
This article has demonstrated how law legitimises the logics of gender oppression and national 
security as diversions in the legal-political debate on Islamic dress in France.  Strategic recourse 
to the shifting logics of gender oppression and national security obfuscates and enacts the colonial 
substratum upon which this discourse is founded and suppresses the colonial condition from public 
consciousness. Despite this subterfuge, knowledge continues to be produced through the epistemic 
lens of the colonial condition and resurfaces under the contemporary label of Islamophobia. 
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Islamophobia manifests in its institutional form through French laws prohibiting Islamic dress and 
permeates French institutional arrangements.  
The analysis of French and ECHR jurisprudence has revealed the instrumental role of law in 
facilitating political agendas. Human rights law plays an integral role in the French Islamic dress 
debate but far from offering a principled protection of vulnerable subjects, the ECtHR legitimises 
and perpetuates the French pursuit of neocolonial, assimilationist agendas through laws restricting 
Islamic dress. This decision making has been achieved via the margin of appreciation and is 
exposed as political and lacking critical reflection on state practices in relation to Islamic dress. 
The colonial context is absent from these decisions, reinforcing the avatars of Muslim women as 
gender oppressed or a terrorist threat in the public-political imaginary.  
Legal decisions and laws restricting Islamic dress send a normative message to civil society that 
is openly hostile to Islamic dress and the visibly Muslim body, as evidenced in Nice. Prohibitions 
on Islamic dress represent an endemic lack of solidarity in society and the correlative alienation of 
visibly Muslim women who are prevented from possible action by the law. Institutional 
Islamophobia understood as racism hinders physical mobility and echoes through French 
institutions. These bodies are not ‘at home’ in a normatively white French public space and 
experience a form of colonial paralysis. Paradoxically the one thing absent from this discourse is 
the colonial subtext.  
Despite the ostensible emphasis on gender oppression and national security in the French Islamic 
dress debate, this article has shown that the regulation of the bodies of visibly Muslim women 
cannot and should not be thought apart from the epistemic lens of colonialism. 
